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STATUS

SAME-SEX UNIONS

AME-sex unions, whether formal or informal, remain unrecognized
under Texas law.' Nevertheless, Texas appellate courts dealt with
disputes concerning same-sex marriages that were recognized by
other states and their proprietary consequences. Of these cases, In re
* B.A., University of Texas, B.A., M.A., B.C.L., Oxford University, L.L.M., Columbia University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University of Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., Texas Women's University, J.D. Southern Methodist University.
1. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001(b) (West 2006). Persons of the same sex may
not be issued a license for a ceremonial marriage, but an informal marriage may be contracted by a man and a woman. Id. § 2.401(a).

895

896

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

Marriage of J.B. and H.B. 2 and State v. Naylor3 both dealt with the proprietary aspects of divorce proceedings involving same-sex couples.
Previously in August 2010, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed
with a Dallas County district court, siding with Texas in In re Marriage of
J.B. and H.B. when it reversed and remanded for ultimate dismissal.4 The
Fifth Circuit concluded that J.B. and his partner, who married in Massachusetts, could not divorce in Texas.5 The Fifth Circuit also concluded the
State's petition for intervention should not have been struck by the district court as untimely and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 6
J.B. seeks a reversal on this decision, and, in the interim, remains in marital limbo.
In State v. Naylor, a Travis County district court granted a divorce in
2011 to a same-sex couple who also were wed in Massachusetts.7 The
State intervened the day after the divorce was granted, arguing the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the divorce.8 Additionally,
the State argued that the sole vehicle for marriage dissolution should be
voidance. 9 The trial court issued the divorce without ruling on the State's
claims, and the State appealed.10 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the State's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, emphasizing "'the rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly
become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment, is well settled."'" Both
of these cases now have been granted review by the Texas Supreme
Court.12 Because the United States Supreme Court recently decided on
two cases based on constitutional questions relating to same-sex unions in
June 2013,13 it is likely Texas will resume its handling these cases now.
2. In re Marriage of J.B. and H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet.
granted). Texas will not dissolve a marriage that it cannot legally recognize between samesex couples, based on the state's accepted definition of marriage between a man and a
woman. See id. at 663.
3. State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434, 435-36 (Tex. App.-Austin 2011, pet. granted).
4. In re Marriage of J.B. and H.B., 326 S.W.3d at 681.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d at 436-37.
8. Id. at 437-38.
9. Id. at 437 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204(b) (West 2006) (stating marriage
between persons of the same sex is void in Texas)).
10. Id. at 438.
11. Id. (quoting Marine v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988)); see also Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 391 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. 1965) (per curium) (stating remedy by appeal is "available only to parties of record"); Gore v. Peck, 191 S.W.3d 927, 929 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006,
no pet.) (dismissing appeal for lack of standing because appellant failed to timely
intervene).
12. In re Marriage of J.B. and H.B., No. 11-0024 (Tex. filed Feb. 17, 2011); State v.
Naylor, No. 11-0114 (Tex. filed Mar. 22, 2011).
13. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (holding petitioners did
not have standing to seek relief in federal court); see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675, 2679 (2013) (holding the "Defense of Marriage Act" (DOMA), a federal statute
defining marriage for all federal purposes as a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife unconstitutional).
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INFORMAL MARRIAGE

In Small v. McMaster,'4 the Houston Court of Appeals was concerned
with issues involving informal marriage and property division.' 5 The alleged wife, Murriah McMaster, claimed she had a common-law marriage
with Jack Small.16 She sued for divorce and property division after the
union lasted a number of years.' 7 She also alleged fraudulent transfer of
property to some of her husband's relatives that deprived the community
estate of valuable assets.1 8 Although the informal marriage and property
issues were bifurcated and tried separately, the first jury trial found evidence of informal marriage between the couple.19 The husband appealed. 20 The Houston Court of Appeals reversed, finding the evidence
at trial insufficient to find an informal marriage. 2 1
The appellate court, applying Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2), 22 concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the fact that the parties
had an agreement to be married and that they had lived together; however the wife did not offer sufficient evidence that she and her alleged
husband had represented to others in Texas that they were married. 23
Thus, they did not demonstrate publicly that they were married to each
other. 24 Occasional references to each other in public as "husband" and
"wife" were not enough. 25 The court of appeals compared the evidence in
this case to that in Danna v. Danna,26 where the Dallas Court of Appeals
found no informal marriage between a couple who had held themselves
out as married only four times over a period of approximately two
years. 27 Representations of marriage must be consistent in order to raise
a genuine issue of fact. 28 Based on the evidence, and in light of the holding in Danna, the court concluded that the "holding out" requirement
had not been met by merely offering as evidence a few instances in which
the parties allegedly referred to each other as husband and wife while
talking to unidentified telephone callers at home, or while speaking to
14. Small v. McMaster, 352 S.W.3d 280 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet.
denied).
15. Id. at 282.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 283-89.
18. Id. at 282.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 288.
22. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(a)(2) (West 2006). An informal or common-law
marriage exists in Texas if the parties (1) agreed to be married, (2) lived together as husband and wife after the agreement, and (3) represented to others that they were married.
Id.
23. Small, 352 S.W.3d at 282, 284, 287.
24. Id. at 286.
25. Id.
26. Danna v. Danna, No. 05-05-00472-CV, 2006 WL 785621, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas
Mar. 29, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("The couple's reputation in the community as being
married is a significant factor in determining the holding[-]out element.").
27. Id. at *1-2.
28. Id. at *2.
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people at church. 29 Determining whether evidence is enough to establish
that a couple held themselves out as married "turns on whether the
couple had a reputation in the community for being married."30 The
court of appeals further found overwhelming testimony from both parties
that their representations to the community tended to show that they
were not married.3 1 The wife never used her husband's last name or even
registered for wedding gifts. 3 2 Nor did she ever establish a joint account
with the alleged husband.3 3 Moreover, although Murriah introduced multiple witnesses, including family members, friends, and acquaintances,
who testified that the couple "exchanged rings" and "committed to each
other" in a "private ceremony," these facts only weighed toward establishing their agreement to be married and not to the "holding out in public" as such. 34 The couple did not have a party to celebrate their marriage,
and Murriah could not produce any documents where she referred to
Jack as her alleged husband. 35 Furthermore, she had filed all of her federal income tax returns as "single" since 1991.36 Finally, when her alleged
husband entered into a ceremonial marriage with a woman named Aiskel
in Venezuela in 1998, Murriah knew of the marriage but made no effort
to file bigamy charges against Jack or otherwise claim that his Venezuelan
marriage to Aiskel was invalid.37 In 1997 or 1998, Murriah moved out of
the home she had previously shared with Jack in League City and moved
into her own home where she operated an antique shop. 38 She did not file
her lawsuit asserting common-law marriage until 2004, the same year the
new owner of her antique business sought to evict her.3 9
Later in 2012, the Houston Court of Appeals had a second look at the
issue of common-law marriage when Jimmy Bailey sought to overturn a
trial court's judgment establishing an informal marriage to his wife,
Christy Hoover. 40 The formal elements of a common-law marriage include that: (1) the man and woman agreed to be married; (2) after the
agreement they lived together in Texas as husband and wife; and (3) the
couple represented to others that they were married.4 1 Bailey challenged
the trial court's finding on the last two elements of informal marriage: the
sufficiency of evidence establishing that the couple had an agreement to
be married and whether the couple held out to the public that they were
29. Small, 352 S.W.3d at 284, 286.
30. Id. at 285.
31. Id. at 286.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 283-84.
35. Id. at 286.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 287.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Bailey v. Thompson, No. 14-11-00499-CV, 2012 WL 4883219, at *1 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 16, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
41. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(a)(2) (West 2006).
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wed.4 2 The court reiterated that the existence of informal marriage is determined on a case-by-case basis, 43 where all three elements must be
presented by preponderance of the evidence in order to find informal
marriage.44 The court found that although the evidence may be conflicting, each case "turns on [each] witnesses' credibility and demeanor." 4 5
Further, "[s]poken words are not necessary to establish representation as
husband and wife." 46 Convincing evidence may be found through conduct
and actions; however, "[t]he element of [representing] to others requires
both parties to have represented themselves as married." 47 Here, the parties opened a joint bank account with rights of survivorship, consistently
wore wedding bands, and attended yearly family celebrations and employers' parties together where they acknowledged each other as husband
and wife.4 8 Jimmy also introduced himself at school events as "stepfather" to Christy's children. 49 Although several documents presented in
court reflected the parties' marital status as "single," these documents
merely went "to the weight of the evidence" and "did not necessarily
negate a marriage."50

C.

ANNULMENTS

Using fraud to induce a marriage came back to haunt a man in El Paso
in April 2012. Miguel Montenegro carefully planned to marry a U.S. citizen to obtain a permanent green card and then quickly divorce her. 5' He
received his come-uppance when the 65th District Court in El Paso
granted his wife an annulment based on fraud, and the El Paso Court of
Appeals affirmed. 52 Having obtained his green card under false pretenses, Montenegro is certainly on his way to deportation with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).53
Montenegro, a Columbian citizen unable to get a tourist visa to return
to the United States met Yamel Avila, a school teacher and U.S. citizen
from El Paso, through an online dating service in 2003.54 After six months
of online courtship, the couple met in person in Mexico and then in Columbia, where Montenegro proposed.5 5 Avila successfully applied for a
42. Thompson, 2012 WL 4883219, at *7.
43. Id. (citing Estate of Claveria v. Claveria, 615 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex. 1981)).
44. Id. (citing Small, 352 S.W.3d at 282-83); see Eris v. Phares, 39 S.W.3d 708, 713
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
45. Thompson, 2012 WL 4883219, at *9.
46. Id. (quoting Winfield v. Renfro, 821 S.W.2d 640, 648 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1991, writ denied)).
47. Id. at *9 (quoting Small, 352 S.W.3d at 285) (emphasis added).
48. Id. at *10-11.
49. Id. at *11.
50. Id. at *11-12.
51. Montenegro v. Avila, 365 S.W.3d 822, 833-24 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 2012, no pet.).
52. Id. at 823, 829.
53. ICE is a division of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security formerly a part of
Immigration and Naturalization Service andU.S. Customes. ICE, Overview, Ice.gov,
http:www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
54. Montenegro, 765 S.W.3d at 823.
55. Id. at 824.
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fianc6e visa to bring Montenegro to the United States, where they married in 2005.56 Soon after the ceremony, Montenegro immediately applied for a two year conditional residency card and then moved in with
his new wife and her parents.57
Over the next three years, Montenegro made monthly transfers of between $100 and $400 to a "friend" in California.5 8 He explained the transfers were to pay off a previous debt.59 He often rejected physical intimacy
with his wife. 60 He purchased a life insurance policy but did not list his
wife as a beneficiary. 6 1 Finally in January 2007, a month after obtaining
his permanent green card and after two years of a roommate-like marriage, Montenegro took a $4,000 cash advance on a personal credit card,
tuned up his car, and gave notice to his employer that he was moving to
Katy, Texas. 62 When Avila returned home from work, all of Montenegro's belongings were gone. 63
The El Paso Court of Appeals, in a legal sufficiency review, found the
marriage to be fraudulent. 64 This allowed the court to "grant an annulment of [the] marriage [because one] party used fraud, duress, or force to
induce the [other party] to enter into the marriage." 65 Because Avila did
not "voluntarily cohabit[ate] with the other party since learning of the
fraud," 66 and because "the trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility
of witnesses," 67 Avila's testimony prevailed.68 She explained that she
stopped cohabiting with Montenegro the moment she realized that he
"never intended to have a meaningful relationship or kids with her, and
that his sole intent . . . was to obtain [a green card]." 6 9 Instead of loving
her, he used her to obtain his legal resident status. Now he is receiving his
just rewards.
II.
A.

CHARACTERIZATION
PARTITIONS AND EXCHANGES

Prenuptial agreements have been on the rise for several years. People
are reacting to the downturn in the economy with a desire to make sure
56. Id. at 823.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 825.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 827. In a legal sufficiency review, an appeals court will reverse only if the
trial court's findings are "so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as
to be manifestly wrong." Sotelo v. Gonzales, 170 S.W.3d 783, 787 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2005, no pet.).
65. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 6.107

(West 2006).

66. Id.
67. Montenegro, 365 S.W.3d at 828; see also City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802,
819 (Tex. 2005).
68. Montenegro, 365 S.W.3d at 829.
69. Id. at 828.
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everything is clear-cut before marriage. Baby boomers -are becoming
more cautious with the divorce rate and prefer to enter into marriage
with the benefit of premarital contracts. 70 Such was the case in Moore v.
Moore, when Gary and Caroline Moore married in 2004.71 Three years
later, Gary sought a divorce and wanted the premarital agreement enforced. 72 A Dallas County district court found sufficient evidence Caroline did not sign the premarital agreement voluntarily and therefore
rendered the contract unenforceable. 73 After dissolving the marriage, the
trial court proceeded to equitably divide $2,798,246.00 from seven business assets deemed part of the community estate and awarded Caroline
her half ($1,399,123.00) as her community interest in those entities. 74
Gary then appealed.7 5
At trial, Caroline testified that prior to signing the agreement, Gary
had explained to her that he had been "'digging himself out of a hole' for
several years" and that the "premarital agreement [was] to protect her
from 'loans, liens, and lawsuits.' "76 He offered to have his attorney and
business partner, Marty Barenblat, draw up the agreement as a "'collaborative process"' between them.7 7 In the rare occasions Caroline spoke to
Barenblat during the drafting process, he never mentioned his conflict of
interest.78 Later, Gary had the foresight to encourage Caroline to hire her
own attorney and offered to pay for the services of Mickey Hunt, a second attorney that shared offices with Barenblat.79 When Hunt saw the
prenup, he suggested changes for Caroline, which included Gary listing
schedules of his assets; Barenblat, who remained the contract draftsman,
never made the changes.8 0 Instead, Barenblat repeatedly stalled Caroline's requests to see the finished contract.8
Without the contract in hand, Caroline flew to Martha's Vineyard for
her wedding. 82 Upon arriving, and over the next several days, she continued to check the hotel's front desk for the contract's delivery to no
avail.8 3 Caroline was finally given the contract to sign a mere four to five
hours before the wedding ceremony. 84 She had no knowledge that her
groom had possession of the agreement in his suitcase for the entire dura70. Richard Acello, Law Practice:Princely Prenup? U.S. Lawyers See Rise in Requests
for Asset Protection, ABA JOURNAL, (Mar. 1, 2011, 4:00 A.M.), www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/princely prenup_.U.S._1awyersseerise-in-requestsfor -asset-protection/.
71. Moore v. Moore, 383 S.W.3d 190, 192 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, pet. denied).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 192-93.
74. Id. at 193.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 196.
77. Id. at 193.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 194.
84. Id.
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tion of the trip.8 5 Instead, she was told days before that the contract was
still undergoing revisions and would be delivered to the hotel as soon as
possible. 86
At time of signing, Gary assured her Hunt had seen and approved the
final draft, and therefore it was acceptable to sign.8 7 In reality, however,
no revisions had been made to the contract after Hunt's initial preview.8 8
In fact, Hunt had not reviewed the contract since that time and had not
approved it.89 At trial, he testified he had not approved any document
and would have forbidden her from even talking to Barenblat about the
matter. 90
Given the express language of the Texas Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 91 the Dallas Court of Appeals applied the test of legal sufficiency to determine the involuntariness of the premarital agreement
between Gary and Caroline. 2 Because the Texas Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act does not expressly define volition, the court relied on
precedent in Martin v. Martin and "construed 'voluntary' to mean an action that is taken intentionally or by the free exercise of one's will." 93 In
its determination, the court considered four questions: whether (1) Caroline could obtain an attorney's advice before signing the agreement, (2)
there were any misrepresentations concerning the contract, (3) there was
any information freely disclosed, and (4) there was any information withheld surrounding the contract. 94
In this case, testimony revealed that Gary intentionally withheld important information about his finances.95 Additionally, he rejected his fianc6e's choice of attorney in favor of steering her toward hiring a lawyer
of his own choosing, after first attempting to use his own lawyer in "a
collaborative effort."96 After lying about having possession of the agreement, which effectively prevented her attorney from reviewing its contents, he presented to her a final draft that lacked full admission about his
assets while simultaneously asking her to waive further disclosure. 97 In a
panic just hours before the ceremony and with Caroline unable to reach
Hunt, Gary then misrepresented to Caroline that Hunt fully backed the
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.002 (West 2006) (making premarital agreements presumptively binding and enforceable under Texas law).
92. Moore, 383 S.W.3d at 194-95; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006(a)(1) (West
2006) ("A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement
is requested proves that . . . the party did not sign the agreement voluntarily.").
93. Moore, 383 S.W.3d at 195 (citing Martin v. Martin, 287 S.W.3d 260, 263 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied)).
94. Id. at 195.
95. Id. at 196.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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agreement and approved of her signing it.98 The happy ending is this: the
appellate court affirmed the districts court's decision, threw out the premarital agreement, and, in its property division, awarded Caroline more
than a million dollars of community assets. 99
B.

REIMBURSEMENT AND ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION

1. Reimbursement
Courts are vested with wide discretionary powers in property division
in suits for divorce and, in the absence of abusing their discretionary powers, the trial court may divide the property, whether it be separate
or community, in such a way as will seem just and proper to the court.1oo
The right of reimbursement to the community estate, although not definite, is an equitable right that a court applies at its own discretion.' 0 ' To
enforce an amount due from one party to the community estate, it is
sometimes necessary to hold that party in contempt of court until various
debts to the community estate are paid. Such was the case in In re Davis.' 0 2 In this divorce proceeding, the trial court held the husband, William Bovas Davis, in contempt for failing to comply with a court order,
and ordered him incarcerated for seventy-two hours and to remain in
prison until he made the payments that he was ordered to make.10 3 The
court's order required Davis to repay several debts owed to the community estate that were "necessary to protect [the] community assets."104
Specifically, the order directed Davis to pay $2,500 to his attorney in fees
and also to pay an additional $2,500 in attorney's fees for his spouse. 05
The Dallas Court of Appeals reviewed the pleadings and noticed the Davis' contradictory testimony.106
Davis appealed while incarcerated, maintaining "certain . .. community
property[-apparently the property generating the need for the payment
of funds from Davis in order to preserve them-]should be sold to him
and not to a third party." 07 Davis "[alleged] that he had access to hundreds of thousands of dollars in funds sufficient to purchase [the assets]."s0 8 Davis filed a writ of habeas corpus arguing (1) that the
contempt order should be void because the underlying order was so am98. Id. at 197.
99. Id. at 197-98, 201.

§ 7.001 (West 2006).
101. See Zeptner v. Zeptner, 111 S.W.3d 727, 734 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no
pet.) (explaining that the right of reimbursement is an equitable claim which falls under the
purview of the trial court); see also Zieba v. Martin, 928 S.W.2d 782, 787 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) (noting the reimbursement is an equitable doctrine and
in considering a claim for reimbursement the court must look at all facts and circumstances
to determine what is fair and just).
102. In re Davis, 372 S.W.3d 253, 254 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2012, no pet.).
103. Id. at 254-55.
104. Id. at 254.
105. Id. at 256 n.1.
106. Id. at 255.
107. Id.
108. Id.
100. TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN.
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biguous as to be unenforceable and (2) that his failure to pay was because
he lacked the funds and not because of a refusal to obey court orders. 0 9
Although Davis needed to conclusively establish by direct evidence to
the court that he had no source by which to pay his debt, 1' 0 the Dallas
Court of Appeals promptly vacated the trial court's order holding Davis
in contempt."' The court cited a lack of specificity in the contempt order
because the order did not separate penalties for each contemptuous act,
which was required to prevent discharge from the confinement.11 2 Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, the court noted that "[t]he Texas
Constitution prohibits imprisonment for debt, so a contempt order based
solely on a failure to pay a debt is void."113
2. Economic Contribution
In a divorce decree or annulment, a court will determine the rights of
both spouses claimed as economic contribution that a court considers
"just and right." 114 This economic contribution is measured by "the reduction of the principal amount of a debt secured by a lien on property
owned before marriage, to the extent the debt existed at the time of marriage." 1 5 Prior to September 1, 2009, § 3.403 of the Texas Family Code
stated that "'[a] marital estate that makes an economic contribution to
the property owned by another marital estate has a claim for economic
contribution [against] the benefitted estate."11 6 Furthermore, § 3.403
provided a formula for calculating the economic contribution." 7
"[A] claim for equitable contribution is a statutory remedy designed to
compensate a contributing estate for reduction in principal amount of
debt secured by a lien on property owned by the benefitting estate.""18
On the other hand, "the recovery for reimbursement-expenditures of a
contributing estate used to improve property of the benefitting estate-is
based only in equity" and "lies within the trial court's discretion.""19
Under an abuse of discretion standard, the Austin Court of Appeals in
Pappas v. Pappas, affirmed a trial court's refusal to recognize any eco109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 257.
112. Id. at 256 (holding handwritten revisions, unexplained notations, and incomplete
sentences in the original document made the document "less than crystal clear").
113. Id. (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18 ("No person shall ever be imprisoned for
debt")); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 157.001, 157.166-.167 (West 2008); but see In re
Henry, 154 S.W.3d 594,596 (Tex. 2005) (jailing for debt is not permissible but for failure to
perform a legal duty, such as failure to pay child support).
114. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 7.001, 7.007(2) (West 2006).
115. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.402(3) (West 2006).
116. Pappas v. Pappas, No. 03-12-00177-CV, 2013 WL 150300, at *4 (Tex. App.-Austin Jan. 10, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op) (alteration in original) (quoting Act of May 28, 2003,
78th Leg., R.S., ch. 230, § 1, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1056, 1056, repealed by Act of May 19,
2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 768 § 11(3), 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 1950, 1953).
117. Id.
118. In re Marriage of Cigainero, 305 S.W.3d 798, 802 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2010, no
pet.).
119. Id.
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nomic contribution to the community estate under former § 3.403 of the
Texas Family Code. 12 0 To do so, the court used the two-prong approach
set forth in Zeifman v. Michels.121 In Pappas, partnership income-considered in this instance a community asset-was used to pay off construction loans for three buildings on William Pappas's separate property
business lot, and Danette Pappas appealed.122 Danette maintained William and her father-in-law took out partnership loans, as opposed to personal loans, after they married for building improvements on three empty
lots owned by the couple's storage business. Because the loans were partnership-based and not personal, this made the debt part of the community estate and therefore subject to the mandatory economic formula
detailed in former Texas Family Code § 3.403.123 The difficulty in
Danette's appeal laid with the fact that she had the heavy burden to establish the economic contribution claim as a matter of law, or she had to
point to evidence that significantly indicated the trial court's erroneous
conclusion.124 This she could not do, given that the trial court originally
deemed her expert's opinion concerning asset valuation not credible.125
The Austin Court of Appeals held firm on the trial court's original findings and found it reasonable for the trial court to find Danette's expert
unreliable. 12 6 The expert attributed the property's fair market value to an
amount three years before the date of the divorce proceedings and did
not include any increases in value-essential components of the mandatory
formula. 127 The trial court found the expert's testimony "too remote to be
a credible proxy for the fair market value of the property at the time of
the community's first contribution [at the time of divorce]."1 2 8 In addition, Danette's expert failed to consider William's equity in the value of
improvements constructed on the property before marriage.129 Citing
City of Keller v. Wilson, the court of appeals stood behind the trial court's
120. Pappas, 2013 WL 150300, at *5.
121. Id. at *2; see Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006,
pet. denied) (spelling out the two-pronged inquiry, whereby an appellate court considers
(1) whether the trial court had sufficient evidence to exercise its discretion, and (2) if so,
whether it erred in its application of that discretion).
122. Pappas, 2013 WL 150300, at *3. The wife asserted the partnership made the loan
payments. Any payments on the loans made by the partnership were effectively distributions of partnership profits, which would be community income. Id.; see also, Lifshutz v.
Lifshutz, 199 S.W.3d 9, 27 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. denied).
123. Pappas, 2013 WL 150300, at *4. The law applicable at the time these parties filed
their divorce petitions provided that "[a] marital estate that makes an economic contribution to property owned by another marital estate has a claim for economic contribution
[against] the benefitted estate." Act of May 28, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 230, § 1, 2003 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1056, 1056 (repealed 2009). The formula is: "Economic Contribution = Equity
[of Wife] x (Community Contributions / (Community Contributions + Equity [of Husband]
+ Separate Property Contribution))." Pappas, 2013 WL 150300, at *4.
124. Pappas, 2013 WL 150300, at *4.
125. Id. at *5.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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decision and refused to second-guess it.130
Danette won, however, on her second issue.131 In district court, William had successfully argued that he owned a mere non-controlling interest (49%) of the partnership as opposed to an equal interest. This meant,
according to his experts, that a 33% discount should be applied to any
community assets held within that partnership.132 On appeal, Danette
successfully argued that based on the trial court's acceptance that William
owned a non-controlling (49%) interest in the business partnership (as
opposed to an equal interest), and based on the trial court's acceptance of
William's cost-approach valuation over Danette's preferred income-capitalization method, the trial court failed to include the valuation of all the
lots attributed as community property-several thousand dollars' worth
of lots, in fact.'33 Danette also argued that the court failed to attribute
any value to over $125,000 worth of improvements to the property.134
The court of appeals agreed. 35 This mistake, the court remarked, resulted in a property division "so disproportionate as to constitute" the
need for remand, and so the court ordered "a new just and right division
of the community estate."136
III. MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY OF
MARITAL PROPERTY
A. AMBIGUOUs DIVORCE DECREES
When construing judgments, such as divorce decrees, a court must apply the general rules regarding the construction of judgments.' 37 If a decree, when read as a whole, appears unambiguous in describing its
property division, then the court must try to bring to effect that decree as
written. 38 Only when there appears to be more than one interpretation
can the court review the record to try to adopt a construction that correctly applies the law.139
The husband in In re M.M. III, Milton McKenzie, filed a Motion to

Clarify and/or to Modify Domestic Relations Order and requested clarification on the division of his military pension.140 Having retired after
130. Id. (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819-20 (Tex. 2005), which
noted the "fact-finder is [the] sole judge of witnesses' credibility and weight to give their
testimony and may choose to believe one witness and disbelieve another").
131. Id. at *9.
132. Id. at *8. The trial court adopted William's expert appraisal, which valued the business known as "Northwest Hills Storage" at an ownership interest of 49% and a noncontrolling interest discount of 33% based on the real estate appraiser's testimony regarding reductions in value for undivided interest. Id. at *9.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing Grossnickle v. Grossnickle, 935 S.W.2d 830, 851 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1996, writ denied)).
137. In re M.M. III, 357 S.W.3d 841, 843 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2012, no pet.).
138. Id.
139. Id.; see also Wilde v. Murchie, 941 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Tex. 1997).
140. In re M.M. III, 357 S.W.3d at 843.
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twenty-six years of military service (and married for twelve of those
years), Milton argued that the wording in his original decree was ambiguous because it "attempts to award [to his ex-wife, Lesa McKenzie,] a portion of his future-earned benefits," which are separate property.141
According to him, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service
(DFAS)142 was erroneously overpaying Lesa and thus unjustly enriching
her. 143 The decree specified:
[Olne half of twelve divided by the number of years of the United
States Army's disposable retired or retainer pay to be paid as a result
of [Milton McKenzie, Jr.'s] service in the United States Army, and
fifty percent of all increases in the United States Army's disposable
retirement or retainer pay due to cost of living or other reasons
144

But the trial court took a look at the decree and decided the wording
was not ambiguous at all.14 5 It just needed to be "read with a bit of common sense."1 46 Milton appealed, but to no avail.147 The clear language of
the decree set out Lesa's interest in Milton's military retirement benefits
at "'one half of twelve,"' i.e., six, "'divided by the number of years' that
[Milton] served in the Army." 148 As put forth in Shanks v. Treadway, the
court adopted the decree's construction that correctly applied the law.149
The court had no authority to enter an order altering or modifying the
unambiguous decree, and thus the El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed. 50
Milton's remedy for any substantive error of law in his decree was by
direct appeal, and the appeals court would not allow him to attack his
decree collaterally. 5 1 The military man was out of luck.
In a second case, Ronald Toler contended the trial court should have
set aside his mediated settlement agreement (MSA) because it was ambiguous and contained "a mutual or unilateral mistake" in it that rendered the agreement unenforceable.152 His main complaint concerned his
railroad retirement account benefits, which provided his ex-wife, Vicky,
141. Id.
142. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service, a division of the Department of
Defense (DOD), oversees payments to DOD service members, employees, vendors, and
contractors. Agency Overview, DFAS (last updated Nov. 6, 2012), www.dfas.mil/press
room/aboutfas.html. The DFAS also provides DOD decision-makers with business intelligence, finance and accounting information. Id.
143. In re M.M. III, 357 S.W.3d at 842.
144. Id. at 843.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.; see Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2003); see also Coker v.
Coker, 650 S.W. 2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1983) (observing that whether a divorce decree is ambiguous is a question of law).
150. In re M.M. III, 357 S.W.3d at 843.
151. Id.; see also Shanks, 110 S.W.3d at 449; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.007(a) (West
2006).
152. Toler v. Sanders, 371 S.W.3d 477, 479 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no
pet.).
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"50% of the community property of Ronald's Railroad Retirement Benefits, with a stop date of September 27, 2010."153 But Ronald's railroad
retirement came in two tiers: Tier I constituted "about 57% of his total
monthly benefit."1 5 4 Tier II, described as "supplemental annuity," made
up about 43% of his monthly amount. 5 5 A week after signing the document, which contained boldface type explaining "THIS AGREEMENT
IS NOT SUBJECT TO REVOCATION," Ronald first noticed that the
retirement section, a handwritten insertion, did not match his understanding of what he signed.156 Regardless, the agreement was marked "APPROVED," and included all of the parties' signatures, including the
mediator's.157 Ronald tried to set aside the MSA and requested a new
trial, only to be met with swift opposition from Vicky. The court approved the MSA as written. Vicky won attorney fees and expenses for her
efforts.' 5 8
The Houston Court of Appeals decided that the issue turned solely "on
the nature of the MSA and its interpretation."1 5 9 The Texas Family Code
provides many methods for divorcing parties to execute a settlement
agreement.160 Among them is a way for parties to execute an agreement
before rendition of the divorce, which must be approved by the judge
presiding over the case.161 The parties may (1) provide, in boldfaced type,
that the agreement is not subject to revocation, (2) sign the agreement,
and (3) have the attorneys present sign the agreement.162 This makes the
MSA "binding on [all] parties."1 63 By complying with all of the signing
requirements at the time of execution, the parties are agreeing to make
the MSA agreement binding at that moment, rather than later, at the time
it is rendered in the court.'" Because the Texas Family Code does not
empower any court to add terms, undermine the intent of the parties, or
change an MSA in any way before incorporating it into a divorce decree,
the Houston Court of Appeals found that Ronald's MSA was "more
binding than a basic written contract."1 65 Furthermore, by according
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.006 (West 2006).
161. Id.; Toler, 371 S.W.3d at 479-80.
162. Toler, 371 S.W.3d at 480 (citing TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.602(b), 6.603(d),
6.604(b), 153.0071(d) (West 2006)).
163. Id. (quoting TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.604(d) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Cayan v. Cayan, 38 S.W.3d 161, 166 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000,
pet. denied); In re Joyner, 196 S.W.3d 883, 890-91 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, pet.
denied).
164. Toler, 371 S.W.3d at 480.
165. Id. (quoting In re Joyner, 196 S.W.3d at 889) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Mullins v. Mullins, 202 S.W.3d 869, 876 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied)
("Unilateral withdrawal of consent does not negate the enforceability of a mediated settlement agreement in divorce proceedings.").
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Ronald's MSA contract language its plain meaning, the court of appeals
found it clear and unambiguous. 166 "The term '50% of the community
property of Ron's Rail Road Retirement benefits' is not reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning."1 67 And as far as "mistake" was concerned, the record did not show a mistake that was mutual, and Ronald's
sworn statement about the mediation could not shed light on any common intention because it "was not properly before the trial court" to examine. 168 Absent any showing of fraud, accident or mutual mistake, the
court of appeals could not examine extrinsic evidence to contradict any
terms of the written agreement, and therefore Ronald was forced to accept the terms of the MSA as written.169
B.

LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY IN BANKRUPTCY

Often small businesses facing financial problems qualify, and can
choose to file, for bankruptcy under either a Chapter 11 or a Chapter 7
plan. However, there are pros and cons to filing under either chapter.
Under a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing the business owner becomes a
"debtor-in-possession," who in effect must answer to all his creditors by
creating an acceptable pay-off plan that successfully pays all creditors
within a three-year or five-year period.170 After the plan has run its
course, all outstanding debt is effectively discharged in bankruptcy.171 On
the other hand, the benefits of Chapter 7 offer the debtor complete liquidation of any and all non-exempt assets. 17 2 The bankruptcy trustee appointed to the debtor's case will sell off all non-exempt assets and use
these funds to pay off the debtor's creditors.' 7 3 Effective the day of filing,
an automatic stay protects a debtor from creditor harassment.174 In addition, the debtor is able to use all of his future income toward establishing
a "fresh start." 7 5
So what happens when a couple files for bankruptcy under a Chapter
11 business reorganization and it is unsuccessful? Chapter 7 bankruptcy is
166. Toler, 371 S.W.3d at 480-81; see also Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 447
(Tex. 2003) (commenting that when language is unambiguous, the court tries to construe
the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to the decree as a whole).
167. Toler, 371 S.W.3d at 481.
168. Id. at 481.
169. Id. at 481; see also DeClaire v. G. & B. McIntosh Family Ltd. P'ship, 260 S.W.3d
34, 35 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (noting that under the parol evidence
rule, a court cannot consider extrinsic evidence absent a showing of fraud, accident, or
mutual mistake); In re Lyon Fin. Servs. Inc., 257 S.W.3d 228, 232 (Tex. 2007) ("A party who
signs a document is presumed to know its contents.").
170. Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TExT, CASES AND PROBLEMS, 396-401 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 6th ed. 2009).

171. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (2006) ("[T]he court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all
debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under section 502 of this title [including child
support obligations], except" government taxes specified under §§ 507(a)(8)(c) and
523(a)).
172. Warren & Westbrook, supra note 170, at 115.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 116.
175. Id. at 361-66.
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the "end game," where all unsuccessful Chapter 11 reorganizations "go to
die." 176 Knowing this, a debtor has an absolute right to convert his case to
Chapter 7, and the creditors can do so by properly showing a bankruptcy
court that the debtor-in-possession under Chapter 11 is failing in his
duties.1 77
Whenever a debtor files for Chapter 7, the trustee's job is to acquire as
many assets as he can to liquidate, since he is acting as a fiduciary to the
creditors.17 8 The debtor who converts from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 is
suddenly faced with having to answer to the trustee for assets that were
previously more secure, and he may have to fight to save future assets in
order to rebuild his "fresh start."
Such was the case in In re Cantu.179 Marco and Roxanne Cantu, joint
debtors and owners of a law firm, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 18 0 The
Cantus proceeded to obtain court approval for a settlement with a first
lienholder, International Bank of Commerce (IBC), which successfully
became a secured creditor entitled to 75% of the debtors' future revenues
over the life of the reorganization plan. IBC perfected a first lien for $2.2
million. 181 In addition, in the settlement, IBC perfected a first lien on all
of Marco Cantu's accounts receivables at his law firm.182 Several months
later, the Cantus chose to convert their Chapter 11 into a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and a trustee was appointed to liquidate their assets. 83 After they
received a large payment from a personal injury case, they filed a "motion to clarify" and sought an order from the bankruptcy court that the
new funds would not be subject to IBC's lien.18 4 In other words, they
asked that the funds go towards their "fresh start" regardless of the previous agreement with IBC under Chapter 11.185 The bankruptcy court denied their motion and the Cantus appealed.186
176. Id. at 364.
177. Id at 364-65; see 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a)-(b) (2006).
178. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2006) (detailing duties of the trustee in Chapter 7);
11 U.S.C. § 1106 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (detailing duties of trustee and examiner in Chapter 11).
179. In re Cantu, 464 F. App'x 385, 386 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curium) (not designated for
publication). Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except for the limited circumstances set forth
in the rule. 5m CIR. R. 47.5.4. However, the practice of denying precedential status to
unpublished decisions is coming under increasing attack, especially when it can change the
outcome of a case. See Williams v. DART, abrogating Anderson v. DART, No. CA3:97CV-1834-BC, 1998 WL 686782 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29,1998) (which held DART, as a political
unit of the State of Texas, was immune to 11th Amendment civil suits). The court rule
giving DART immunity effectively took it away on appeal two years later, thereby receiving opposite results specifically because of the rule denying precedential value to opinions
that, today, are readily available electronically. See id.
180. In re Cantu, 464 F. App'x at 386.
181. Id.
182. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. §506(a)(1) (2006) ("An allowed claim of a creditor secured
by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim [with payment priority].").
183. In re Cantu, 464 F. App'x at 386.
184. Id.

185. Id.
186. Id.
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In the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Cantus argued that they were
not bound to the previous settlement agreement with IBC on three
grounds: that (1) the party bound to a settlement agreement is the Chapter 7 trustee, not the debtor; (2) it was not reasonable to hold debtors to
this agreement, especially after the bankruptcy court approved a conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7; and (3) under 11 U.S.C §H 348 and
552 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Cantus' lien to IBC should be "relieved"
post-conversion, thereby working to allow the funds to go to the debtors'
"fresh start."18 7 The court addressed only the Cantus' third issue, finding
they waived the first two by failing to raise them at trial.188 The court
found that under the Bankruptcy Code the Cantus were not exempt from
IBC's lawsuit after conversion. 18 9
The crux of the issue turned on the timing of their settlement with IBC,
and the Fifth Circuit was not going to allow the debtors to wiggle out of
the agreement to repay their debt on a mere technicality.1 90 The Cantus
argued that under § 348(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, "settlement agreement[s] must be treated as if the parties entered into it before the commencement of the case,"191 and under § 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
states "post-petition receivables are not subject to any lien resulting from
the agreement."'1 Here, however, the Cantus failed to recognize the difference between the term "claim" and "settlement agreement."1 93 The
Fifth Circuit pointed out that the term "claim" construes "a right to payment," and IBC's "right to payment ... did not arise at the time the claim
was resolved through the parties' agreement."1 94 Thus, IBC's security interest in the Cantus' law firm accounts receivables did not arise "prepetition" under section 348(d).' 95 Nor did IBC's interest trigger the application of § 552(a).196 In this case the Cantus, who converted to Chapter 7
as a strategy to maintain control over law firm receivables, had to concede their newly earned funds to IBC.197
Revisiting a previous case, Small v. McMaster, this time in bankruptcy,198 it is apparent that a bankruptcy court can enforce an automatic
stay over an ex-spouse who unilaterally files bankruptcy, despite the di187. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 348(d) (2006) ("[A] claim against the estate of the debtor
that arises after the order for relief but before conversion ...

shall be treated . . . if such

claim [arose] before the date [of the] petition); but see 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006)
("[Piroperty acquired by [the] debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject to
any lien resulting from any security agreement entered into by the debtor before [the
debtor commenced] the case.").
188. In re Cantu, 464 F. App'x at 386.
189. Id. at 387.
190. Id. at 387; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 348(d), 552(a).
191. In re Cantu, 464 F. App'x at 387; see 11 U.S.C. § 348(b) (2006).
192. In re Cantu, 464 F. App'x at 387; see 11 U.S.C. § 552(a).
193. In re Cantu, 464 F. App'x at 387.
194. Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 348(d).
196. In re Cantu, 464 F. App'x at 387.
197. Id.
198. In re Small, 486 F. App'x 436 (5th Cir. 2012).
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vorce court orders.199 Moreover, it can do so without violating the principles of collateral estoppel or res judicata. 200 After a Houston trial court
found her informally married, 201 Murriah McMaster filed for a divorce
and property division on her own during the pendency of her husband's
appeal. 202 In 2007, a divorce court held a trial to determine community
property division, where a jury awarded McMaster $4,000 in monthly
temporary spousal support. 203 McMaster never saw a penny because Jack
Small filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, creating an automatic stay on his
creditors at the moment of filing. 204 By 2008, McMaster had had enough,
and she moved in state court to enforce her temporary spousal support
order, asking the trial court to sentence Small to 179 days of confinement
for each violation and to order Small to pay $124,000 in delinquent support.205 Small successfully countered by asking for a writ of mandamus
from the Houston Court of Appeals, which held that the state trial court's
civil contempt order violated Small's automatic stay in bankruptcy. 206
Small then sued McMaster and her attorney in bankruptcy court,
claiming damages as a result of the motion for enforcement. 207 The bankruptcy court sided with Small, holding that both McMaster and her attorney (1) knew about the automatic stay and (2) acted intentionally to
violate that stay. 208 The court awarded Small over $42,000 in damages,
costs, and attorney's fees for the enforcement action. 209 McMaster
appealed. 210
First, Murriah argued that Small lacked standing to bring any adversary
proceeding in bankruptcy court, and that because the bankruptcy court
refused to apply the doctrines of abstention, collateral estoppel, or res
judicata, its findings amounted to a relitigation of all the previous divorce
proceedings. 21 1 Second, McMaster argued that her enforcement action
fell under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1)-(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, exempting
it from automatic stay procedures because it was for criminal contempt,
not civil contempt, and furthermore, because it involved domestic sup199. Id. at 437.
200. Id. at 438-39.
201. Small v. McMaster, 352 S.W.3d 280, 282 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011,
pet. denied) (deeming John Small and Murriah McMaster not informally married).
202. In re Small, 486 F. App'x at 437; see also Small, 352 S.W.3d at 282.
203. In re Small, 486 F. App'x at 437.
204. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (2006) ("[A] petition filed . .. operates as a stay,
applicable to all entities . . . [in] any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against [a]
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case."); but see 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) 2006) (directing that exceptions to automatic stays include "the establishment or modification of an order for domestic support obligations") (emphasis added).
205. In re Small, 486 F. App'x. at 438.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 439-40.
209. Id. at 441.
210. Id. at 438.
211. Id. at 439; see also United States v. Shanbaum, 10 F.3d 305, 310 (5th Cir. 1994)
(noting res judicata requires the same claim in previous litigation); Swate v. Hartwell, 99
F.3d 1282, 1289 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating collateral estoppel requires an identical issue in
previous litigation).
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port obligations. 212 Third, McMaster argued the bankruptcy court erroneously awarded Small attorney's fees, as a result of its reliance on
inadmissible hearsay and because Small, as the plaintiff, failed to meet his
heavier burden of establishing attorney's fees under the factors put forth
in Johnson.213
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the issue of standing and affirmed, finding
that Small, as the debtor had a private right of action in bankruptcy court
against any person who willfully violated the automatic stay. 214 Interestingly, the court also found McMaster's contention that Small's claims
were in connection with her divorce irrelevant. 2 15 The court affirmed the
bankruptcy court's non-application of collateral estoppel and res judicata,
noting "Small was entitled to relief [based] solely due to the violation of
the stay." 216 It remarked that the bankruptcy court granted no relief
based on previously litigated state-court findings, and therefore gave partial relief consistent with family court principles. 217 In addition, the court
concluded that § 362(b)(1), which exempted criminal actions from automatic stays, did not apply here because McMaster's attorney willfully testified that they gave Small numerous opportunities to come up with the
money before using incarceration to induce payment of support. 218 Further, in reviewing the bankruptcy court's decision de novo, the Fifth Circuit noted no error in refusing to apply the Bankruptcy Code section
exempting domestic support obligations. 2 19 McMaster and her attorney
sought the enforcement action without first considering "whether there
was property that was not property of the estate from which to make the
[spousal] payment." 220 Lastly, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the attorney's
fees under a clear-error standard. 221 The court noted it would be difficult
for any bankruptcy court to apply the Johnson standard for the fees. 2 2 2
212. In re Small, 486 F. App'x at 439; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (2006) ("[T]he
commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor"
does not operate under the stay.); 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) ("[T]he commencement or
continuation of a civil action or proceeding . .. [against the debtor] for the establishment or
modification of an order for "domestic support obligations" does not operate under the
stay.).
213. In re Small, 486 F. App'x at 440; see also Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled on other grounds by Blanchard v.
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989) (holding that the plaintiff has the burden of proving, by clear
and convincing evidence, a right to reasonable fees, considering the novelty and difficulty
of the issues, the prerequisite skill to perform the legal services, the customary fees in the
area, and the preclusion of accepting other employment during the pendency of the case).
214. In re Small, 486 F. App'x at 438.
215. Id. The bankruptcy court only rendered judgment that McMaster and her attorney
violated the automatic stay in bringing the enforcement action, and because it made no
other decisions regarding property, the Fifth Circuit only addressed the claim of standing.
Id.
216. Id. at 439.
217. Id. at 438-39.
218. Id. at 439-40; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1).
219. In re Small, 486 F. App'x at 440.
220. Id. (emphasis in original).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 441.
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This bankruptcy court did not even discuss the twelve factors found in
Johnson in its opinion.223 In addition, Small acted pro se in the proceeding, which limited the bankruptcy court's ability to analyze Small's attorney's fees in any procedural context. 224 However, the appeals court found
it helpful to review Small's testimony to bills totaling over $400,000 (of
which nearly $100,000 were for the mandamus) and noted that McMaster
never argued that those fees were unreasonable. 225 The moral of the
story: before initiating an enforcement action on a Chapter 7 debtor and
ex-spouse (that was never a legal spouse), make sure you are trying to
limit enforcement to only property that is not part of a bankruptcy estate.

C.

EXEMPTIONS

1. Homestead
During a contested divorce where one spouse is awarded the marital

homestead along with its mortgage requirements, can this mortgage obligation be deemed part of "domestic support obligations" (DSO) that
would become a non-dischargeable debt in bankruptcy? This was the issue addressed in In re Nugent.2 2 6 An acrimonious divorce tumbled out of
a courthouse in Alabama and, as a result, the Bankruptcy Court of the
Southern District of Texas was forced to examine the prolonged quarrel
dealing with the original financial obligations of the couple's
homestead. 227
It is normally against policy, in these common procedures, for a bankruptcy court to allow discharge under §§ 523(a)(5) and 523(a)(15) of any
debt arising out of the marital bond. 228 The plaintiff in In re Nugent, however, failed to plead both aforementioned sections of the Code, thus
opening a window for the bankruptcy court to decide on its own if the
debt in question fit into the "category governed by the unpleaded provision. "229 The plaintiff had only himself and his choice of attorney to
blame for the mistake, for this is what that bankruptcy court ultimately
did.230
In this case, Samuel Woodward gave up the marital home and all its
contents to his ex-spouse, Susan Ehrler-Nugent, in divorce. 231Along with
the house, however, an Alabama court required Ehrler-Nugent to take
over all the mortgage payments, indemnify Woodward from any future
mortgage payments (including a home equity line of credit (HELOC)),
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.

226. In re Nugent, 484 B.R. 671 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2012).
227. Id. at 673.
228. Id. at 684; see also 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5) (2006) (dealing with spousal support and
child support); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (dealing with property division-or "not of the kind
[of debt] described in [§ 523(a)(5)] that is incurred by the debtor in the course of a
divorce").
229. In re Nugent, 484 B.R. at 684.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 673.
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and to pay monthly amounts of $233.43 to Woodward (for a total of
$14,000) for his equity on the home. 2 3 2 Ehrler-Nugent made only two
monthly payments towards Woodward's equity while she continued to
make mortgage payments for only three years.233 This forced Wells
Fargo, who held the first lien on the HELOC, to come after Woodward
for the unpaid amount (approximately $93,000).234 Woodward sought an
enforcement motion in Alabama district court requiring Ehrler-Nugent
to comply with the original divorce judgment. 235 But in order to stop
Woodward from prosecuting her, Ehrler-Nugent and her current husband, Robert Nugent, filed a Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy in Houston and received a discharge of their debts in January 2012.236 Woodward
initiated proceedings in bankruptcy court, complaining of the discharge,
asking for the sums owed to Wells Fargo for the lien and asking that the
$14,000 owed to him in equity be exempted from discharge under 11
U.S.C. § 527(a)(5).237
To support his case, Woodward pointed to the statutory definition of
DSO, which clarified that the term included "a debt that accrues, before,
on, or after the date ... for relief ... that is .. . owed or recoverable by
... a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child's parent,
legal guardian or responsible relative . . . or a governmental unit." 238

The Fifth Circuit had previously interpreted § 523(a)(5) in In re Nunnally and developed several factors to determine whether the obligations
at issue were dischargeable. 239 Referring to In re Nunnally, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas had to examine the "true
nature" of Ehrler-Nugent's obligations. 240 Because Ehrler-Nugent and
Woodward had a divorce trial, the bankruptcy court was forced to consider the Alabama divorce court's intent in obligation characteristic. 241 If
the intent in the original judgment was clear, it would control the bank232. Id. at 675.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 674-75.
235. Id. at 675.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 673; see also 11 U.S.C. § 527(b) (2006) ("A debt relief agency providing
bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person shall provide . . . notices required [that inform
that person] . . . [that] if [they] choose to file under chapter 7, [they] may be asked by a
creditor to reaffirm a debt."); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) ("A discharge under section 727 ... of
this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt .. . for a domestic support
obligation.").
238. In re Nugent, 484 B.R. at 677 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (2006) (defining domestic support obligation).
239. Id. at 679-80; see also In re Dennis, 25 F.3d 274, 277-78 (5th Cir. 1994) (observing
that although the label given an obligation in a divorce decree is not dispositive, the bankruptcy court has the ultimate authority to characterize a debt under the Code.); In re Jones,
9 F.3d 878, 880 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding a debt can be characterized in a bankruptcy court
as "alimony" even though under state law, alimony may not exist); In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d
1024, 1027 (5th Cir. 1975). Alimony is interchangeable with "spousal support" or "maintenance." In re Dennis, 25 F.3d at 277-78.
240. In re Nugent, 484 B.R. at 679.
241. Id.
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ruptcy court's characterization of the obligation.2 4 2 Only if that intent was
ambiguous would the bankruptcy court be allowed to turn to extrinsic
evidence and look for evidence under the list of factors in In re
Nunnally.243
The court found the intent ambiguous. On one hand, the divorce judgment was silent on the home's equity. 244 It ordered monthly payments
made to Woodward, much like a DSO, but did not include any specific
sections marked "alimony" or "property division." 245 On the other hand,
the judgment specifically stated "No alimony is awarded." 246 It characterized the home as the "marital home place" (a joint asset not usually considered a domestic support obligation) and it used the term "settlement"
to describe the $14,000 Ehrler-Nugent owed Woodward instead of referring to it as "spousal support." 2 4 7
Extrinsic evidence was also insufficient. Both Ehrler-Nugent and
Woodward testified that Ehrler-Nugent had full control over the HELOC
funds because she placed them into her separate account and used the
funds to pay for trips, a Mercedes Benz, and property taxes. 24 8 The court,
however, was specifically waiting for Woodward, the party with the burden in this suit, to provide evidence that aligned with the In re Nunnally
factors. 2 4 9 With Woodward coming up short on evidence, the court decided that Ehrler-Nugent's previous marital obligations could be effectively discharged in bankruptcy through the loophole created by
Woodward's attorney when he failed to plead both Code sections. 250
Since only one (§ 523(a)(5)) was before the court, and Woodward did not
sufficiently prove Ehrler-Nugent's debt was a DSO, the court instead decided on its own that Ehrler-Nugent's debt could be characterized as "a
property division" and discharged it.251 Now Woodward is obligated to
Wells Fargo for the debt and has no home to sell to recover any equity. 252
2. Liens on Homesteads
When a homestead passes to a guarantor's wife upon his death, the
decedent's creditor cannot seize that homestead absent evidence that the
guarantor acted as his wife's agent with intention to cede his homestead
242. Id.
243. Id.; see also In re Evert, 342 F.3d 358, 364 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing In re Nunnally
factors, which include: (1) disparities in the parties' earnings; (2) the parties' business opportunities; (3) their physical conditions; (4) expected future financial needs; and (5) any
benefit each party would have gained had the marriage continued).
244. In re Nugent, 484 B.R. at 681.
245. Id. at 682.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 683.
249. Id. at 683-84; see also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291 (1991) (holding the
plaintiff has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence an exemption to
discharge).
250. In re Nugent, 484 B.R. at 684.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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to that creditor. 53 Under the Texas Probate Code, the "title to an [insolvent homestead] estate, where a constituent member of the family survives, descends to those entitled to inherit free from claims of
creditors." 2 54 Furthermore, the Texas Constitution generally protects and
exempts homesteads under non-bankruptcy law. 2 5 5 Although "[a]n owner
may apply for a home equity loan for any purpose," 25 6 and he is not "precluded from voluntarily using the proceeds of an equity loan to pay on a
debt owed to the lender,"2 57 a lien can only be voluntarily created under
a written agreement with the consent of the owner and the owner's
spouse. 258
In Martinek Grains & Bins, Inc. v. Bulldogs Farms,Inc., a homeowner
who defaulted on several promissory notes from his business transferred
his homestead to his childrens' trust one month before his death. 259 He
then continued to use the homestead as his residence. 260 At his death, his
widow continued to live on the 200 acres of homestead land. 26 1 After the
widow died, business creditor Martinek Grains & Bins brought suit in a
Dallas district court to set aside the homestead transfer, alleging conspiracy to defraud under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 262 However,
Martinek lost on summary judgment. 263 Martinek then appealed, arguing
that homeowner C.L. Miller, who died owing $627,916.00 to the company, fraudulently transferred his ownership of 200 acres in homestead
land to the "Miller Children's Irrevocable Trust" to protect it from
seizure, knowing he was in default of four promissory notes. 2 0 Martinek
argued the trial court "erred on the merits" in rendering the summary
judgment when the party did not even move for a summary judgment. 265
Reviewing de novo, the Dallas Court of Appeals agreed with Marti253. See Martinek Grain & Bins, Inc. v. Bulldog Farms, Inc., 366 S.W.3d 800 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 279 (West 2003).
254. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. v. Olson, 920 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no
writ) (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 279).
255. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a) ("The homestead of a family, or of a single adult
person, shall be, and is hereby protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts
except for: (1) the purchase money thereof, or a part of such purchase money; (2) the taxes
due thereon; (3) an owelty of partition imposed against the entirety of the property by a
court order or by a written agreement of the parties to the partition, including a debt of
one spouse in favor of the other spouse resulting from a division or an award of a family
homestead in a divorce proceeding; (4) the refinance of a lien against a homestead, including a federal tax lien resulting from the tax debt of both spouses, if the homestead is a
family homestead, or from the tax debt of the owner; [and] (5) work and material used in
constructing new improvements[.]").
256. In re Chambers, 419 B.R. 652, 671 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009) (citing TEX. FIN. CODE
ANN. § 11.308 (West 2010)) (quoting TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 153.18(2) (West 2006)).
257. In re Chambers, 419 B.R. at 671 (alteration in original).
258. See TEX. CONs-r. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(A).
259. Martinek Gains & Bins, Inc. v. Bulldog Farms Inc., 366 S.W.3d 800, 03 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.).

260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.; see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
263. Martinek Grains, 366 S.W.3d at 803.

ANN.

§§ 24.001-.013 (West 2009).

264. Id.
265. Id. at 804; see also Teer v. Duddleston, 664 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tex. 1984).
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nek. 2 66 The court, however, held the transfer of the property to the trust,
if there was any, was not a violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers
Act. 267 Martinek then switched gears to focus on two new assertions that
attacked the transfer deed: (1) that the property was community property, and (2) that Miller's widow was personally liable for her husband's
debt to Martinek upon death. 268 Citing Family Code §§ 3.003 and 3.202,
Martinek argued that because the homestead was community property
held in both C.L. and Olga Miller's names, the joint community property
remained liable for 100% of the debt owed to them. 2 6 9 Martinek further
argued that when Miller died insolvent, and the homestead passed to
Miller's widow free and clear of Miller's debts, the land became subject to
the widow's own debts because there was no longer any surviving
spouse. 270
The Dallas Court of Appeals, applying Family Code § 3.201 on spousal
liability, reaffirmed that the widow had "no personal liability for
[Miller]'s guaranty of the farm's debt unless [Miller] was acting as [the
widow's agent]"2 7 1 when he originally guaranteed the debts to Martinek
and unless those debts were also for "necessaries." 2 7 2 Because the debt
was business debt, Martinek "failed to show the trial court erred" and
therefore the Dallas Court of Appeals overruled Martinek on its last two
issues.273
IV. DIVISION ON DIVORCE
A. DIVIsIoN PROCEEDINGS
"A defendant who challenges [a] trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction through a special appearance carries the burden of negating all
bases of personal jurisdiction." 2 74 In Aduli v. Aduli, the husband appealed a default divorce decree arguing the trial court erred by denying
his special appearance. 275 He also contended that the trial court abused
its discretion by allowing the husband's attorney to withdraw and by
adopting his wife's proposed property division in the marital estate without sufficient evidence. 276 The Houston Court of Appeals disagreed. 277
The court affirmed the trial court's denial of his special appearance, as
266. Martinek Grains, 366 S.W.3d at 804.
267. Id. at 807.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 808.
270. Id. at 807.
271. Id. at 808 (emphasis added).
272. Id.; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.201 (West 2006) ("A person is personally
liable for the acts of the person's spouse only if: (1) the spouse acts as an agent for the
person, or (2) the spouse incurs debts for necessaries. A spouse does not act as an agent for
the other spouse solely because of the marriage relationship.").
273. Martinek Grains, 366 S.W.3d at 808.
274. Aduli v. Aduli, 368 S.W.3d 805, 814 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no
pet.).
275. Id. at 813.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 821.
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well as the trial court's denial of the husband's motion for continuance
and new trial.278
Fardad Aduli, an Iranian citizen, married his wife Valerie, a French native, in Louisiana in 2003, and the couple resided in New Orleans under
work visas. 279 In 2008, Valerie moved into a Houston condominium that
Fardad purchased and furnished. 280 Fardad fully supported the move.281
Fardad also sent Valerie a monthly living allowance and paid the mortgage and utilities for her. 282 According to Fardad, he had no intention of
moving to Houston to be with his wife because the couple had decided to
separate. 283 According to Valerie, Fardad had every intention of moving
to Houston after receiving his green card.2 84
When Valerie learned Fardad was having an affair she promptly filed
for divorce. 285 A Houston trial court set temporary orders and injunctions shortly thereafter, under which the discovery provisions dictated
both parties were to provide sworn inventories of both their separate and
community property. 286 The trial court also ordered Fardad to pay for
Valerie's attorney fees. 28 7 The trial court found clear evidence of domestic abuse as well,288 and issued a restraining order against both parties
barring them from withdrawing monies from any financial accounts. 289
Over the next few years, Fardad repeatedly violated the orders by withdrawing account monies, refusing to pay Valerie's attorney, and failing to
submit discovery. 290 Moreover, his work visa expired, so he left the
United States and went to Paris.291 Nine days before his trial, Fardad's
attorney asked and was granted a withdrawal, citing an inability to effectively communicate with his client.292
Two days prior to trial, Fardad requested a continuance, arguing he had
filed for bankruptcy, had no monies to pay an attorney, and needed time
to secure the proper visa before returning to the United States. 293 When
his request was denied, Valerie appeared in court at the agreed time and
date for the divorce with her property inventories; Fardad was a noshow. 294 The trial court granted the divorce that day, and divided the
couple's property according to the evidence available which Valerie
278. Id.
279. Id. at 810.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 817.
289. Id. at 811.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 811-12.
294. Id. at 812-13. Fardad, having lost his work visa, went to Paris and tried to apply for
a new visa from there. Id. at 812.
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presented. Fardad appealed. 295
Fardad first argued the trial court had no jurisdiction over him to grant
a divorce, maintaining his last marital residence was in New Orleans. 2 9 6
The appeals court, recognizing that "more and more frequently one
spouse may, by choice or necessity, work in a state .

.

. apart from the

family unit," 297 ultimately decided that it did have personal jurisdiction
with minimum contacts over Fardad because of his extensive maintenance and ownership of the Houston condo. 298 The court agreed with
Valerie's testimony about how her husband visited her in Texas regularly
despite Fardad's claims that he never came to Houston. 2 99
The court also found no error when the trial court denied the husband's special appearance, because Fardad never presented evidence or
represented at the time he made this motion for a special appearance that
he could not be physically present in the United States.3 00 He never
presented evidence that it would be an excessive burden to travel to
Houston for the divorce proceedings, especially after his pattern of visiting Houston many times to see his wife.301 Prior to his bankruptcy, he
earned over $160,000 per year.302 Valerie, an abused spouse who had no
earning potential, had an especially strong "interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief in Texas."3 03
The Houston Court of Appeals also examined the trial court's refusal
to grant Fardad a new trial. 304 He argued that he conclusively established
all the elements required to get a new trial under the equity principals in
Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc..3os In a post-answer default judgment, Fardad, who was the defaulting party, had the burden to prove he
295. Id. at 813.
296. Id. at 814.
297. Id. at 815.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 815; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985)
(holding that a state may establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the
defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state); Phillips v.
Phillips, 826 S.W.2d 746,748 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (holding that
a single act can support jurisdiction as long as there is substantial connection with the
forum state).
300. Aduli, 368 S.W.3d at 817.
301. Id. Mr. Aduli never asked the Court to appear via video or via telephone, a specific right. Id. See also Johnson v. Handley, 299 S.W.3d 925, 929 (Tex. App.-Dallas, 2009,
no pet.) (commenting that "[w]hen [an inmate's] request to appear by ... effective means
[i.e. telephone or video conference] is made, a trial court's denial of [his] motion to appear
is an abuse of discretion unless the court allows the inmate to proceed by some other
effective means").
302. Aduli, 368 S.W.3d at 818.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 818.
305. Id. (citing Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. 1939)).
"Under Craddock, default judgment should be set aside when [(1)] the defendant establishes that the failure to appear was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference,
but the result of an accident or mistake; (2) [the new trial motion] sets up a meritorious
defense; and (3) granting [a new trial] will occasion no unduly delay or otherwise injure the
plaintiff." Id. at 819.

2013]

Family Law: Husband and Wife

921

had no notice of the default judgment hearing. 306 If Fardad could have
proved this, he would not have been required to present proof of the last
two elements under Craddock.30 7 However, Fardad never argued failure
to receive a notice and thus he needed to prove the remaining two elements.3 08 Because it was Fardad's burden to bring a sufficient record to
show the trial court's error and he brought nothing to the appeal, the
court was obligated to support the trial court's decision. 309 The appellate
court had only Fardad's affidavit to review, which revealed he was aware
of his trial date. 310 Additionally, his affidavit did not establish a meritorious defense to the property division, nor did it describe how a new trial
would not harm Valerie. 311
Lastly, Fardad's complaint about the marital property division was reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 312 Fardad argued that his
ex-wife's proposed information sheets and financials were never formally
admitted into evidence at the trial and that there was no testimony to
support her valuation of assets, not to mention the amount Valerie
claimed he wasted of their community estate. 313 The appeals court disagreed with Fardad, noting he too was required to provide inventories
and failed to do so. 3 1 4 He repeatedly violated the temporary orders by
withdrawing money from his accounts and not paying attorney's fees.3 15
Despite the fact that Valerie's inventories were never formally entered
into evidence, the record revealed the trial court took "judicial notice of
[it] for evidentiary purposes." 3 16 Valerie's discovery inventories contained
stated values for all of Fardad's assets, both in Iran and in the United
States, as well as life insurance policy values that were, as a whole, acknowledged "as a shorthand rendition of her testimony."3 17 It was
Fardad's burden to show adequate evidence of his valuation of the community estate to help the trial court make a fair division.3 18 According to
the court of appeals, the trial court warned Fardad that his pleadings
would be struck, and therefore he could not subsequently complain that
the trial court judge lacked good information to justly divide the
property. 319
306. Id.; see also Almendarez v. Valentin, No. 14-10-00085-CV, 2011 WL 2120115, at *4
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 24, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (citing
Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 744 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam).
307. Aduli, 368 S.W.3d at 819.
308. Id.
309. Id. (citing Christiansen v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1990)); see also In re
D.A.P., 267 S.W.3d 485, 487 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
310. Aduli, 368 S.W.3d at 819.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 820.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 820-21.
316. Id. at 820.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 820-21; see also Deltuva v. Deltuva, 113 S.W.3d 882, 887 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2003, no pet.) ("When a party does not provide values for property to be divided, that
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In a second case, Susana Knight added her husband Geoff's business,
Knight Corporation, as a party in their divorce. 320 She further alleged
Knight Corporation and its subsidiaries, Knight Filter and Grasslyn,
L.L.C., were Geoff's alter egos when he acted fraudulently to squander
and misappropriate community assets from accounts. 321
Knight Corporation filed a special appearance with the trial court that
was denied. 322 The company then appealed, filing a writ of mandamus
based on the assertion that the district court abused its discretion in denying the special appearance. 323 The Houston Fourteenth District Court of
Appeals, citing Ogletree v. Matthews, 324 agreed that the case was ripe for
a mandamus review, 325 but noted that in general Texas appellate courts
only have appellate jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments when a
statute "specifically allows a particular kind of interlocutory appeal." 326
However, there is no such right to an interlocutory appeal if a family law
matter is involved. 327
Susana argued that the trial court had jurisdiction over Knight Corporation and that the company waived its special appearance when Geoff,
an employee, filed a motion to quash service before Knight Corporation,
as a company, filed. 3 2 8 The trial court overruled this argument, finding
Geoff filed his motion to quash individually and not on behalf of the company, and therefore that there was no special appearance made by Knight
Corporation. 329
The Houston Court of Appeals, reviewing de novo, agreed.33 0 Knight
Corporation did not waive its special appearance because the company,
as a party, never acknowledged the trial court's jurisdiction nor took any
action inconsistent with challenging personal jurisdiction.33 1
In her amended complaint, Susana alleged that Knight Corporation
committed fraud in Texas by entering into a stock purchase agreement,
transferring company stock to her husband, Geoff, and misappropriating
party may not complain on appeal that the trial court lacked sufficient information to properly divide the property.").
320. Knight Corp. v. Knight, 367 S.W.3d 715, 722 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2012, reh'g denied no pet.).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 723.
323. Id. at 722.
324. Ogletree v. Matthews, 262 S.W.3d 316, 319 n.1 (Tex. 2007).
325. Knight, 367 S.W.3d at 723; see also In re J.W.L., 291 S.W.3d 79, 83 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 2009, mand. denied) (determining a denial of a special appearance in a family
law case was subject to mandamus review).
326. Knight, 367 S.W.3d at 723.
327. See, e.g., TEX. Civ. Pluc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (West 2008); In re
Loya, 290 S.W.3d 920, 921 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
328. Knight, 367 S.W.3d at 723.
329. Id. at 724.
330. Id.
331. Id.; see, e.g., Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex. 1998) (seeking a
ruling on a jurisdictional discovery dispute was not a waiver); Angelou v. African Overseas
Union, 33 S.W.3d 269, 276 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (filing a Rule
11 agreement with the court before an assertion of a special appearance is not a waiver).
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corporate funds in a conspiracy to deprive her of community property. 33 2
She attempted to pierce the corporate veil of Geoff's companies to get to
the business assets.3 33 The appeals court, noting "[d]ue process will not
permit the plaintiff to use insignificant acts in the forum to assert jurisdiction over all co-conspirators," 334 observed that the Texas Supreme Court
had previously refused to recognize the contention of specific jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants based only on the effects of suspected conspiracy involving a Texas resident.33 5 It carefully examined the trial
court's jurisdictional contacts with the Knight Companies and found no
connection between them, the forum, and the litigation. 336
Although Susana argued that Knight Corporation maintained an interactive website that permitted Texas consumers to "submit their specific
needs" and the company purchased products from Texas, the appeals
court declined to find even general jurisdiction because Knight Corporation's sales in Texas "cannot weigh as a contact" to support jurisdiction in
Texas.33 7
Finally, remarking that it was Susana's burden to prove the corporation
imputed its contacts to Texas, 33 8 the appeals court found no alter ego and
therefore no ability to pierce the veil, noting Susana failed to prove that
the parent company was fused with its subsidiaries for jurisdictional purposes. 339 In other words, she failed to prove Knight Corporation controlled any internal business operations of its subsidiaries "greater than
that normally associated with a common ownership and directorship." 3 4 0
The appeals court conditionally granted Knight Corporation's writ of
mandamus, "confident [that] the trial court [would] vacate its order denying the special appearance." 341 The writ of mandamus would only apply if
the trial court failed to do this. 34 2
332. Knight, 367 S.W.3d at 727.
333. Id. at 729.
334. Id.; see also Nat'l Indus. Sand. Ass'n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. 1995)
("Conspiracy as an independent basis for jurisdiction . . . [distracts] from the ultimate due
process inquiry.").
335. Knight, 367 S.W.3d at 727 (citing Nat'l Indus. Sand. Ass'n, 897 S.W.2d at 773).
336. Id.
337. Id. at 729; see also Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801,
808 (Tex. 2002) ("When a nonresident defendant purposefully structures transactions to
avoid the benefits and protections of a forum's laws, the legal fiction of consent [to being
sued there] no longer applies."); but cf Experimental Aircraft Ass'n Inc. v. Doctor, 76
S.W.3d 496, 507 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (finding general jurisdiction existed based partly on the defendant's website); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89
F.3d 1257, 1265-66 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding jurisdiction exists where one clearly does business over the internet by entering into contracts and repeatedly transmitting computer
files).
338. Knight, 367 S.W.3d. at 730; see BMC Software BeIg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d
789, 798 (Tex. 2002).
339. Knight, 367 S.W.3d at 730.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 730-31.
342. Id. at 731.
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DiviSION

A wife's evidence of her husband's adultery and cruelty is reason
enough for a court to award a disproportionate amount of community
property to the wife in a divorce proceeding. In Newberry v. Newberry,
the 171st District Court in El Paso ordered the husband to pay 95% of
the community debts and awarded the wife $80,000 worth of marital assets, while leaving him a mere $11,000 in assets. 343 Here, the wife successfully presented strong evidence that the husband was addicted to
pornography and continued to communicate to other females that he was
"available" despite family counseling. 344 The husband appealed, arguing
legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding, based on only the wife's testimony that he was adulterous. 345 The
wife testified in court that her husband was alone with his high school
sweetheart in a room with the door closed and lights off for more than
twenty minutes. 346 The El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed. 34 7
Reviewing only the evidence and inferences supporting the trial court's
verdict, the appellate court found "more than a scintilla of evidence" to
support the lower court's ruling, and therefore the husband's challenge
failed. 348 Because adultery can be shown by circumstantial evidence,
when the husband admitted to his wife (after they separated) that he attended a friend's party and stayed in a room with his sweetheart with the
door closed, he sealed his own fate when the court of appeals deferred to
the fact-finder's determination of her testimony and the amount of
weight given to it.349 Unfortunately for the husband, the court may still
grant a divorce on cruel treatment grounds,35 0 especially where there is
evidence of an accumulation of several different cruel acts. 351 Despite
attempts to reconcile and attend counseling, the husband had an ongoing
problem with viewing pornographic materials on the Internet and televi343. Newberry v. Newberry, 351 S.W.3d 552, 558 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2011, no pet.).
344. Id. at 557-58.
345. Id. at 555.
346. Id. at 556.
347. Id.
348. Id.; see also Minn. Min. and Mfg. Co. v. Nishika Ltd., 953 S.W.2d 733, 738 (Tex.
1997); Henry v. Henry, 48 S.W.3d 468, 474 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
("More than a scintilla of evidence exists where the evidence supporting the finding, as a
whole, rises to the level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in
their conclusions.") (citing Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.
1997)).
349. Newberry, 351 S.W.3d at 556; see also Morrison v. Morrison, 713 S.W.2d 377, 380
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ dism'd.); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.704(b) (West 2006) ("If
the husband or wife testifies, the court or jury trying the case shall determine the credibility
of the witness and the weight to be given the witness's testimony.").
350. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.002 (West 2006); Finn v. Finn, 185 S.W.2d 579, 582
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1945, no writ.) (holding that a spouse's conduct rises to the level
of cruel treatment when his or her conduct renders the couple's living together
insupportable).
351. See. e.g., Hester v. Hester, 413 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, no
writ.); Emerson v. Emerson, 409 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, no
writ.).
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sion, which he blamed on his wife's lack of intimacy. 35 2 In fact, the husband had become quite shrewd about his pornography habit by
purchasing and hiding a new laptop, and creating new email addresses
and aliases by which to communicate with pornographic websites. 353
Regardless of the cruelty or abuse grounds, the husband's largest contention on appeal was the trial court's unbalanced property division. 35 4
Under an abuse of discretion review for this issue, the El Paso Court of
Appeals affirmed.3 55 After re-examining the record, the court found that
the husband admitted on the record that he made "frequent unnecessary
expenditures," had no familiarity with several outstanding community
credit card debts, and had withdrawn all money from his 401K retirement
account (valued at $32,362.00) when he was fired from his job for stealing
computers from his employer. 35 6 The court found the trial court's original
property division-albeit disproportional-was thoroughly supported by
"evidence of substantive and probative character." 357
According to the "acceptance of benefits doctrine," once a party accepts the benefits of a trial court judgment distributing a couple's marital
property, that same party cannot appeal and complain of an unjust and
unfair division. 358 James Richard accepted five boats as part of the community property distribution during his divorce. 359 He then sold two
boats to pay down loans and had a third boat under a sales contract. 360
Nevertheless, James appealed the trial court's property division.
James tried to use the narrow exception found in Waite v. Waite361 to
overcome the acceptance of benefits doctrine with little success, arguing
the sale of the two boats, a thirty-nine foot 2002 Mainship and a twentynine foot 1994 Proline, was a "matter of economic necessity" to keep him
out of bankruptcy. 362 He complained his expenses were far greater than
his income, but was incapable of expounding on this with any actual proof
of his monthly income or bills. 36 3 James was unable to convince the trial
court to reconsider his plight and his appeal was quickly dismissed as
352. Newberry, 351 S.W.3d at 557.
353. Id. at 557-58.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 564.
356. Id. at 563-64.
357. Id. at 563; see also Garcia v. Garcia, 170 S.W.3d 644, 649 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2005, no pet.).
358. Richards v. Richards, 371 S.W.3d 412, 413 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012,
no pet.); see also Carle v. Carle, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1004 (Tex. 1950) ("A litigant cannot treat
a judgment as both right and wrong, and if he has voluntarily accepted the benefits of a
judgment, he cannot afterward prosecute an appeal therefrom.").
359. Richards, 371 S.W.3d at 413.
360. Id. at 415.
361. Waite v. Waite, 150 S.W.3d 797, 803 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet.
denied) (detailing the "economic necessity" exception to the acceptance of benefits doctrine, which "applies when the acceptance of benefits is not voluntary because of financial
duress or other economic circumstances").
362. Richards, 371 S.W.3d at 415.
363. Id. at 415.
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moot. 364
Another case illustrates that appointing a receiver for an ex-husband's
separate property is one way a trial court can protect divorcing parties'
assets. 365 During a divorce, a wife filed a motion asking for appointment
of a receiver after the husband refused to follow the trial court's temporary orders. 366 Throughout contentious litigation, the husband was ordered to pay child support and attorney's fees, and to hand over
discovery during the divorce process. After four enforcement hearings
and court-ordered sanctions, he still failed to "get out of the red." 3 67
Judge Lori Hockett of the 255th District Court ordered a receiver for the
husband's separate property and specifically explained that the husband's
refusal to disclose his asset information, together with this admission to
the court that he had disposed of property within his possession, led the
court to this outcome.3 68 Unhappy with this decision, the husband
launched an interlocutory appeal, arguing that the trial court used an incorrect standard in appointing a receiver. 369 He argued that the court had
no authority to appoint a receiver and that the court sought "to 'punish'
him for his failure to comply with his . . . obligations." 3 7 0
The Dallas Court of Appeals, under an abuse of discretion standard of
review, upheld Judge Hockett's decision. 371 The court found the appointment appropriately "necessary and equitable to protect the parties and
their property." 3 72 A receiver can assure that no inappropriate transfers
of a party's property are made without approval.37 3 And although the
husband argued vehemently that the trial court had no authority to place
his separate property under receivership, he failed to show any clear and
convincing evidence to the trial court of owning separate property. 374 Additionally, the court of appeals noted that Texas law would not limit a
trial court to appointing a receiver only to community property, even if
this husband had been successful at identifying separate assets. 3 7 5 Section
6.502 of the Texas Family Code speaks of "properties of the parties" without describing any assets as "separate" or "community."3 7 6 The Texas
Family Code does not expound further by using either term, and if the
legislature had intended to limit receivership to just community property,
364. Id. at 413.
365. In re C.F.M., 360 S.W.3d 654, 658 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.).
366. Id. at 656.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 657.
369. Id. at 655.
370. Id. at 658.
371. Id. at 661.
372. Id. at 658-59; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.502 (West 2006).
373. In re CF.M., 360 S.W.3d at 659.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.502(a)(5) (West 2006) ("While a suit . .. is pending
... the court may render an appropriate order, including the granting of a temporary
injunction ... and including .. . an order .. . appointing a receiver for the preservation and
protection of the property of the parties.") (emphasis added).
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it would certainly have done so by defining it further. 377
C.

Ex-SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE

The issue of what constitutes an ex-spouse working on a "full-time"
basis arose in In re C.P. Y. 378 In this case, a former husband that was initially required to pay his ex-wife alimony petitioned the court to have his
support duty stopped, alleging that his ex-wife, a contract attorney, was
now working full-time. 37 9 Judge Cherry of the 301st Judicial District
Court in Dallas County sided with the husband and ordered the ex-wife
to pay back $22,000 for paid, but unearned, alimony and $13,500 in attorney's fees. The ex-wife appealed.3 8 0
The Dallas Court of Appeals held there was a "genuine issue of material fact" as to the parties' meaning of what a "full-time basis" meant in
their original divorce decree, and therefore, it reversed and remanded.3 8 1
The court found the original decree language ambiguous when applied to
the facts of the couple's case. 3 8 2 When the wife originally divorced her
husband, the latter agreed to pay the former until June 1, 2010 or until
the wife remarried, returned to work full-time, died, or another court order modified the alimony. 38 3
The ex-wife, Lisa, took a job as a contract attorney that generally had
her working less than forty hours per week. 3 8 4 She claimed the trial court
incorrectly granted summary judgment to her ex-husband, Lawrence,
based on evidence that she worked over forty hours on a mere three occasions.3 85 She argued the term "full time basis" should be based on a
person working forty hours or more per week and further argued she was
generally a contractual, part-time attorney, and a full-time caregiver for
the couple's son.3 8 6
Lawrence, eager to end his alimony obligations, argued the Texas Labor Code definition of "full time"3 87 controlled in his summary judgment
affidavit.38 8 He contended "full time" meant "at most" a forty-hour work
week. 389 He further testified that it is his "experience and belief" as an
377. In re C.F.M., 360 S.W.3d at 656; see e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.202(d) (West
2006) ("All community property is subject to tortious liability of either spouse incurred
during marriage."); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §6.707(a) (West 2006) ("A transfer of real or
personal community property or a debt incurred by a spouse while a suit for divorce or
annulment is pending that subjects the other spouse or the community property to liability
is void with respect to the other spouse if the transfer was made . . . with the intent to
injure the rights of the other spouse.").
378. In re C.P.Y., 364 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.)
379. Id. at 412.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 415,
382. Id.
383. Id. at 412.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 413-14.
387. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.

§ 408.042(L) (West 2006).
388. In re C P.Y., 364 S.W.3d at 413-14.
389. Id. at 414.
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attorney himself, that when an attorney bills for forty hours, that attorney
"must work more hours than he/she is actually able to bill." 390
The Dallas Court of Appeals first looked for a common meaning of the
term "full time" and found none that expressly defined the number of
hours worked. 391 The Texas Insurance Code defines an "eligible employee" as one who works "on a full time basis and who usually works at
least 30 hours a week." 392 Moreover, this definition does not include any
person who is a seasonal, temporary, or substitute employee.3 9 3 To complicate matters, a full-time police officer is defined as an officer working
"on average at least 32 hours per week, exclusive of paid vacation." 394 In
sum, the court could not successfully determine the meaning of the words
"full time" by the decree's writing itself, and, because it remained an issue of fact as to the parties' intent, the Dallas Court of Appeals found
that it had to remand for a new trial.3 9 5

390. Id. (emphasis in original).
391. Id.; see WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 919 (1981). "Full-time," as an adjective, is defined as "employed for and
involving full time," and as a noun, is defined as "the amount of time considered the normal or standard amount for working during a given period." Id.
392. In re C.P.Y., 362 S.W.3d at 414 (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1501.002(3) (West
2009)).
393. Id.
394. Id. (citing TEX. Gov'T. CODE ANN. § 614.121 (West Supp. 2011)).
395. Id. 415; see also Italian Cowboy Partners Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
341 S.W.3d 323, 333 (Tex. 2011) ("In construing a contract, a court must ascertain the true
intentions of the parties as expressed in the writing itself."); Milner v. Milner, 361 S.W.3d
615, 619 (Tex. 2011).

